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Abstract
In the framework of Agent-Based Complex Systems we ex-
amine dynamics that lead individuals towards spatial segre-
gation. Such systems are constituted of numerous entities,
among which local interactions create global patterns which
cannot be easily related to the properties of the constituent
entities. In the 70’s, Thomas C. Schelling showed that an im-
portant spatial segregation phenomenon may emerge at the
global level, if it is based upon local preferences. Moreover,
segregation may occur, even if it does not correspond to agent
preferences. In real life preferences regarding segregation are
influenced by individual contexts as well as social norms; in
this paper we will propose a model which describes the dy-
namic evolution of individuals tolerance. We will introduce
heterogeneity in agents’ preferences and allow them to evolve
over time. We will show that it is possible to dynamically get
a distribution of tolerance over the agents with a low average
and in the same time to deeply limit global aggregation. As
the Schelling’s model showed that individual tolerance can
nevertheless induce global aggregation, this paper takes the
opposite view showing that intolerant agents can avoid seg-
regation in some extent.
Introduction
In his article Schelling (1971), Thomas Schelling developed
a model of segregation and analysed how a simple prefer-
ence not be a part of a minority in one’s neighbourhood,
without necessarily favouring dominance of one’s own type,
can generate small micro-shocks which have drastic conse-
quences at the macro level. Aggregation happens through
a chain reaction, even though the agents do not wish such
an extreme situation. Agents interact only locally with their
neighbours: every one agrees to stay in a neighbourhood
with individuals that have the opposite type, only if there are
enough individuals with the same type in the vicinity. This
proportion is fixed by a threshold, denoted by the tolerance
ratio.
More generally, the ’micromotives and macrobehaviour’
problematic asks the question of the compliance between
local micro-motives and the resulting macro-behaviour. To-
day, as problems become more and more complex, this prob-
lematic is more relevant than ever. In the fields of sociology,
economics, ecology, energy, ..., each one has many a priori
on the global consequence of his own actions. Most often, a
person thinks in good faith that his action will produce faith-
ful results for the community. For example, one can think
that:
(a) intolerant behaviour lead to high segregation
(b) tolerant behaviour lead to low segregation
Let i (resp. i¯) stands for individual intolerance (resp.
tolerance) and S for a high level of global aggrega-
tion/segregation. Hypothesis (a) and (b) can be reformu-
lated by the micro to macro link [i → S] and [¯i → S¯]. The
Schelling’s model provides first an example for the expected
case [i → S]; but, as it shows that tolerance can nonetheless
induce a significant level of segregation, it provides also an
example for the paradoxical link [¯i → S] where the macro-
outcome is intuitively inconsistent with the preferences of
the agents who generate it.
This paper shows that macro-segregation can be deeply
limited despite the presence of intolerant agents; thus, it pro-
vides an example for the dual case [i → S¯]. In the model
we propose, each agent has his own threshold of tolerance.
At each time, for each agent, the tolerance is adapted using
some meta-rules. As a consequence, the emergent state of
the ’world’ results from a spatio-temporal adaptive dynam-
ics. The scientific question addressed in this work is an evo-
lution of the Schelling Model, which consists in considering
an adaptive micro level of tolerance and analysing its impact
on the segregation phenomenon observed at the macro level.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we pro-
pose a generic model of satisfaction. Section 3 shows the
global behaviour of models using the simple Eulogy to Flee-
ing rule. Section 4 examines the effects of introducing adap-
tive tolerance thresholds on the nature of frontier between
patterns. Section 5 proposes the new model which allows to
conciliate local intolerance and a low level of segregation.
Finally, future works are listed and conclusions are drawn.
A generic model of satisfaction
The Schelling’s checkerboard model of residential segrega-
tion has become one of the most cited and studied models in
many domains as economics, sociology, complex systems
science,... Pancs and Vriend (2003), Zhang (2004), Gerhold
et al. (2008), Banos (2009). It is also one of the predecessor
of agent-based computer models Rosser (1999). Taking in-
spiration from this model, we define a more generic model
of satisfaction (GMS).
The GMS is similar to a 2-D cellular automata model: the
’world’ includes numerous agents embedded on a toroidal
grid. For each agent, the perception is centered on his lo-
cal neighbourhood only, where the neighbourhood is consti-
tuted of the nearest cells surrounding him. We note di(t)
the social degree of the agent ai at time t, that is the num-
ber of agents in its neighbourhood. Since some locations
remain empty, the size of the neighbourhood is the maxi-
mum number of neighbours an agent can have. There are
two types of agents and each agent has its own type. Dur-
ing a run the agent’s type cannot change. The satisfaction
of one agent is relative to the type of the agents in its own
neighbourhood. For convenience we will denote by a color,
yellow and green, the two possible types. Y (resp. G) repre-
sents the set of agents in the yellow type (resp. green type).
Thus, the number of agents is (#Y +#G) and at the global
level, the basic hypothesis is (#Y = #G). At each time t,
for each agent ai, si(t) (resp. oi(t)) represents the number
of neighbours with the same type (resp. opposite type), so
si + oi = di.
From Thresholding to Satisfaction
For each agent ai, we assume that there is some quantity
measured by the variable Qi in the range [0, 1] which de-
pends on si and oi. At each time t, the value requiredQi(t)
is a number in the range [0, 1] which denotes the threshold
under which the agent is satisfied according to Qi(t). We
define the local boolean indicator satisfied as:
satisfiedi(t) = (Qi(t) ≤ requiredQi(t)) (1)
Finally, we define the global indicator satisfactionRatio in
the range [0, 1] as:
satisfactionRatio(t) =
#{satisfiedi(t) = true}
#Y +#G
(2)
This is the ratio of satisfied agents at time t; if it is equal to
1, then all the agents are satisfied at time t.
Local rule
Once the static description of the model is specified, one
must add rules that govern the dynamics of agents’ move-
ment. At each time, the motives of each agent are driven
by its own satisfaction: an unsatisfied agent is motivated to
move away to one vacant location. The gap between micro-
motives and macro-behaviours is due to overlapping neigh-
bourhoods: an agent who moves according to its own inter-
est affects not only the neighbourhood it leaves and the one
it arrives in, but also affects, in the long run, all the agents.
In GMS we do not fix how an agent moves; this will be
specified later when the model will be instantiated. One can
only say that there are many ways for an unsatisfied agent to
move to a vacant place.
An index to measure the degree of aggregation
To have some insight into the aggregation level, it is neces-
sary to measure the global aggregate over the world. We
reformulate measures proposed by Schelling, Carrington
and Goffette-Nagot Schelling (1971), Carrington and Troske
(1997), Goffette-Nagot et al. (2009). First, we define a
global measure of similarity as:
s(t) =
1
#Y +#G
∑
i
(1−Qi(t)) (3)
Then, we define the aggregateIndex by
aggregateIndex =


s−srand
1−srand
if s ≥ srand
s−srand
srand
else
(4)
where srand is the expected value of the measure s im-
plied by a random allocation of the agents in the world. A
null value for this index corresponds to an average random
configuration. The maximum value of 1 corresponds to a
configuration with two homogeneous patterns only.
The Schelling’s model of segregation
The Schelling’s model of segregation is a particular case for
the generic model of satisfaction. In the following we are
going to indicate its specificities.
How to compute satisfaction? In the Schelling model the
quantity Qi(t) takes into account the proportion of neigh-
bours of the opposite type; it is computed as the ratio be-
tween the number of neighbours having the opposite type
and the social degree.
Qi(t) =
{
oi(t)
di(t)
if di(t) 6= 0
0 else
(5)
For example, if a yellow agent ai has three yellow neigh-
bours and two green neighbours, Qi =
2
5 . If there are no
neighbours for the agent (i.e. if di = 0), Qi = 0. If all
neighbours have the same type (i.e. if oi = 0 and si 6= 0),
Qi = 0. If all the neighbours are in the opposite type (i.e. if
si = 0 and oi 6= 0), Qi = 1. As the initial spatial config-
uration is randomly chosen, the initial distribution of Qi is
binomial.
Table 1: Ratio between the number of neighbours of oppo-
site type to the social degree: Qi =
oi
oi+si
Coloured values: agent ai, will be satisfied if Qi is under the
tolerance threshold 0.37
@
@@s
o
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 .500 .666 .750 .800 .833 .857 .875
2 0 .333 .500 .600 .666 .714 .750
3 0 .250 .400 .500 .571 .625
4 0 .200 .333 .428 .500
5 0 .166 .285 .375
6 0 .142 .250
7 0 .125
8 0
In this model, all the agents have the same threshold of
tolerance: it is a constant value (noted tolerance) which is
fixed before the run. So, at each time t, for each agent ai,
equation 1 becomes:
satisfiedi(t) = (Qi(t) ≤ tolerance) (6)
The agents are said tolerant if the tolerance is greater than
0.5 (0.5 ≤ tolerance) and intolerant otherwise. We use the
Moore neighbourhood commonly employed in agent-based
models. So the neighbours of an agent are those living in
the eight nearest cells surrounding him and the degree di
is a number between 0 and 8. For instance, if the toler-
ance threshold is 0.37, one particular agent ai, at time t,
will be satisfied if Qi(t) is under this value; this happens in
the following eighteen cases: (oi = 0), (si = 2, oi = 1),
(si = 3, oi = 1), (si = 4, oi = 1), (si = 5, oi = 1),
(si = 6, oi = 1), (si = 7, oi = 1), (si = 4, oi = 2),
(si = 5, oi = 2) and (si = 6, oi = 2) (see the coloured val-
ues on table 1). More, if there are exactly eight neighbours,
i.e. di = 8, (see table 1, the diagonal line) such a tolerance
means that the agents are intolerant and cannot suffer more
than two opposite neighbours.
How do unsatisfied agents move away ? In standard
Schelling’s models agents move only to satisfy their own
interest. This requires that agents must be able to access dis-
tant information in order to determine whether or not it will
be satisfied in a new vacant cell. This kind of behaviour is
characteristic among economical agents that seek to maxi-
mize their gain. Nonetheless such a behaviour come out of
the idea of agents acting approximately rational, rather eco-
nomically rational in terms of utility and breaks down the
principle of locality (see Brownlee (2007)).
Global behaviour Regarding the micro-macro problem-
atic, the Schelling model provides examples for the two
cases: [i → S] and [¯i → S] where i (resp. i¯) stands for
individual intolerance (resp. tolerance) and S stands for a
high degree of global segregation. While the first case is the
intuitive situation where micro-intolerance induces macro-
segregation, the second case is more surprising as it shows
that tolerant behaviours can nonetheless induce a global seg-
regation.
The Schelling Model with the Eulogy to
Fleeing rule
In standard Schelling’s models agents aspire to satisfy their
interests in the new places they move in. In this section, we
rather assume a reaction from agent without real cognitive
abilities expressed by the simple Eulogy to Fleeing rule (EF
rule).
The Eulogy to Fleeing rule
The Eulogy to Fleeing rule is agreeing with the definition
of the term satisficing proposed by Herbert A. Simon Simon
(1956). ”Satisficing describes the selection of a good enough
solution, the selection of a decision that meets a minimum
threshold or aspiration level, the selection of which occurs
in the context of incomplete information or limited compu-
tation” Brownlee (2007).
The EF rule is defined as follows: for each unsatisfied
agent, a cell is randomly chosen ’all over the world’ and
the agent moves to this cell if and only if it is vacant. So
the agents may move at random towards a new location ac-
cording to their preferences by allowing utility-increasing or
utility-decreasing actions. Moves do generate new satisfied
or unsatisfied agents by a chain reaction until an equilibrium
is reached. At a time t, if all the agents are satisfied, the
EF rule has no effect and then such a configuration is a fixed
point for the dynamics.
This simple rule is more in the spirit of the complex sys-
tem paradigm, and, as locally there is no seeking for im-
mediate benefits, it is interesting to know its global conse-
quences. Although it is easy to build some particular cases
where the EF rule does not converge, in the following sim-
ulations this rule leads the system towards an equilibrium.
Let’s note that although similar rules based on a random
choice of vacant locations are already proposed (Edmonds
and Hales (2005), Izquierdo et al. (2009)), they do not look
completely identical to the EF rule. In particular, with the
EF rule, an unsatisfied agent may stay in place for a while if
the randomly chosen locations are occupied.
Simulation and results
In this paper, all the simulations are realized in the Net-
Logo1 multiagent programmable modeling environment
Pham (2004), Wilensky (1999). For each simulation, the
agent’s features are updated in an asynchronous way and
1http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/
the global geographic parameters are fixed. The world is a
square of locations horizontally and vertically wrapped. An
agent with type ’yellow’ (resp. green) is represented by a
yellow (resp. green) square. A black square represents a va-
cant location. A simulation stops at convergence, when all
the agents become satisfied.
The world is a grid-square composed of 10000 locations.
This size is a good compromise between the necessity to
have a large value to avoid small space effects and the con-
venience to have a small value to achieve short computation
time. There are 1000 vacant locations, knowing that the den-
sity rate is 90% and 4500 agents in each type. We imposed
a random initial configuration: in the cases studied below,
the value of srand is indistinguishable from 0.5; thus initial
configuration induces an aggregateIndex closed to 0.
We conducted two types of experiment: in the first one, all
the agents are intolerant and in the second they are tolerant.
Intolerant agents For this first experiment the tolerance is
set to 0.37 (see table 1); so all the agents are intolerant. We
can see in figure 1 the result of the agents spatio-temporal
evolution at the end of a representative run: after 1150 steps
all the agents are satisfied (i.e. satisfactionRatio = 1),
the mean Qi over the whole population (noted Q) is 0.024
and the aggregateIndex is 0.957. From 100 indepen-
dent runs we obtain, a mean of 0.952 (0.0041)2 for the
aggregateIndex and 0.024 (0.0022) respectively for Q.
We can observe the emergence of large spatial homogeneous
patterns. Moreover the borderland between the patterns is
almost build with every vacant location (black square). So
patterns are isolated by a no-man’s-land of vacant cells.
Tolerant agents Here, the goal is to show that segrega-
tion occurs even if no agent strictly prefers this. We set the
tolerance to 0.63 (see table 1), so all the individuals are tol-
erant. In particular, if an agent has exactly eight neighbours,
it can bear up to five opposite agents in its vicinity. Figure
2 gives an example of the evolution of the agents’ locations
during a representative run. At the end, after 228 steps, all
the agents are satisfied, the mean Qi over the whole pop-
ulation is 0.229 and the aggregateIndex is 0.548. From
100 independent runs we obtain, a mean of 0.53 (0.0119) for
the aggregateIndex and 0.233 (0.0094) respectively for Q.
While spatial segregation is not an attribute of the rational
individuals’s behaviour, we can observe the emergence of
many segregationist patterns, although they have a smaller
size that in the previous case (see figure 1). More, vacant
locations are scarce on borderline because with a high toler-
ance level vacant cells are not requisite to delimit segrega-
tionist patterns.
2standard deviation is shown in ()
Figure 1: The Eulogy of Fleeing rule: tolerance = 0.37
View at convergence (ticks = 1150): Q = 0.024
aggregateIndex = 0.957
Discussion
In this section, we have shown that in spite of the use of
a more simple and realistic local rule, the model produces
a comparable global behaviour than the classical Schelling
model.
We have shown that both intolerant and tolerant local be-
haviours lead to the satisfaction of all the agents with the
emergence of global segregationist patterns. Moreover, the
gap between the tolerance and the mean Qi over the whole
population is surprisingly large at the end of a run. In this
way complex dynamics build much more liveable configu-
rations than necessary. With intolerant agents, vacant places
are required to form the frontiers and insulate agents in ho-
mogeneous patterns. In the next section, we propose to
modify the model in order to insulate segregationist patterns
without using vacant locations mainly.
From no-man’s-land to mediator-land
Most often, in real life some individuals are tolerant whereas
others are intolerant. In a model, there are two ways to take
into account this fact: either fixing a distribution for the
tolerance, or dynamically evolving tolerance to ’converge’
toward a particular distribution. The first solution requires
not only to choose one distribution: uniform, normal, pois-
son,. . . but also to fix its parameters: mean and standard de-
viation.
Figure 2: The Eulogy of Fleeing rule: tolerance = 0.63
View at convergence (ticks = 228): Q = 0.229
aggregateIndex = 0.548
Adaptive local rule
As we have no a priori on a target level of tolerance, we
choose to start from an intolerant configuration and to ap-
ply a local rule to gradually increase the tolerance. For in-
stance, when a person is immersed in an unknown world,
his first attempt will be to meet people which look like him;
so initially, certainly with many apriority, such a person is
gregarious or intolerant. Then, if his requirement is too high
relatively to the environment, it will be difficult for him to
find a fitting place; therefore a natural tendency will be to
gradually reduce his stress by decreasing his gregariousness
and/or increasing his tolerance.
In this new instance of the GMS, each agent has its own
tolerance threshold. Furthermore, each individual threshold
may vary over time. So, for each agent ai, at each time t,
the satisfied indicator (see equation 1) becomes:
satisfiedi(t) = (Qi(t) ≤ tolerancei(t)) (7)
Initially, the tolerance of each agent is set to a very small
value, therefore an agent is at first radically intolerant and so
will be unsatisfied. At each time, for each unsatisfied agent,
a cell is randomly chosen ’all over the world’ in order to
move in if it is vacant, otherwise, i.e. if the cell is already
occupied, the agent stays put and adapts its own tolerance to
the context by increasing its value with a small increment.
Simulation and results
For each agent, the tolerance is initialised to 0.001 and we
chose a small increment of 0.003. We can see on figure 3 the
spatio-temporal evolution of the agents at the end of a rep-
resentative run. After 663 steps all the agents are satisfied;
the mean tolerance over the population is 0.365, the mean
Qi over the population is 0.049 and the aggregateIndex
is 0.892. Even if dynamics are more complex than in
Schelling’s model, we can observe the emergence of spa-
tial homogeneous patterns yet. On 100 runs we obtain, a
mean of 0.919 (0.0120) for the aggregateIndex and 0.360
(0.0047) respectively for the mean tolerance. So, on aver-
age, dynamics lead agents to remain intolerant and a high
segregation emerges at the global level; once again this is an
example for the case [i → S].
Figure 3: Dynamic tolerance
View at convergence (ticks = 663):
aggregateIndex = 0.892 mean tolerance = 0.365
We can observe that the frontier between homogeneous
patterns is constituted both by vacant cells (black square)
and by the most tolerant agents (white circle), i.e. agents
with tolerance ≥ 0.39; therefore, for a significant part,
homogeneous regions are isolated by places for mediation
where opposite agents may co-exist. We can note that there
are also tolerant agents outside themediator-land; this corre-
sponds to scoria3 in some areas where former conflicts have
led to the local hegemony of one of the two types; thus data
collected from the own tolerance of the agents allow to learn
3Scoria is the dross that remains after the smelting of metal
from an ore
more about the past of the system.
Discussion
A first result is that dynamics leads the mean tolerance to-
ward a relatively weak value (0.36); as a consequence, when
all the agents become satisfied, they remain on average in-
tolerant. The second result is that segregation is still high
(0.919). The third result is that in a world where agents are
on average intolerant there are some tolerant agents which
play a crucial role in the spatial distribution. This can serve
as a clue to extend the model toward more mosaic-like struc-
ture. Type-mix would be favoured by the existence of se-
cluded agents amidst individuals having an opposite type. In
the present model, this is impossible because agents are not
tolerant enough to endure such a situation: we have to en-
hance the dynamics to allow tolerance to reach high values.
On the contrary, the presence of scoria shows that one agent
with high tolerance may be useful in a moment at a place
then becomes superfluous later in the same location; so de-
crease the tolerance of satisfied agents may help to avoid
such ’frozen region’. All this suggest us to manage two an-
tagonist dynamics: increasing and decreasing the tolerance;
so, we expect to significantly lower the level of segregation
while maintaining a weak mean tolerance.
How to avoid high segregation ?
In this last section the goal is to respond to the question:
How intolerant agents can become satisfied without the
emergence of macro segregation?
In the new model we propose, there are two antagonist
dynamics, the first one increases the tolerance of unsatisfied
agents, whereas the second decreases the tolerance of satis-
fied agents. Initially, the agents have a weak tolerance and
are thus radically intolerant and unsatisfied.
• An unsatisfied agent, can either move to a vacant place
or else simply increase its tolerance (for details, see the
previous section).
• Conversely, for a satisfied agent ai, if the difference delta
between its tolerancei and the value of Qi in the place it
lives in is too high, its tolerance decreases.
In real life, when a person is no longer confronted with dis-
tressing circumstance, his ability to cope later in such a sit-
uation is reduced. This phenomenon can be explained by a
mechanism of forgetfulness. In the model, an agent is satis-
fied if it is not faced to a large enough number of opposite
agents. If over time such a lack of confrontation persists,
then the agent gradually reduces his threshold of tolerance.
Parameter space exploration
There are two main parameters that control the dynamics of
tolerance: the amount of increment inc and decrement dec.
First we conduct a parameter space exploration in order to
chose suitable values for the simulation.
In the context of complex systems, most often there are
several parameters which together determine the global dy-
namics. In order to choose values for the parameters used
in the simulations, we have first conducted an exploration
of the parameter space. The objective to minimize both the
mean tolerance and the global aggregateIndex is difficult
because when the first one decreases, the second increases
and conversely. Therefore, we conduct a tradeoff-analysis to
identify compromise for which the two criteria are mutually
satisfied in a Pareto-optimal sense. This is a typical multi-
objective optimisation problem where the optimal solutions
correspond to a set of compromises expresses by a Pareto
front Dyer et al. (1992), Belton and Stewart (2002). In prac-
tice, the Pareto front is proposed to a human decision-maker
who then chooses a solution according to his expertise.
For all the tests we perform, the parameter delta is set to
0.1. We focus our effort on areas that lead to interesting re-
gions where convergence occurs with low tolerance and low
segregation: each test corresponds to one couple (inc, dec)
in the range [0.025, 0.040] × [0, 0.030]. There are 60 tests
and, for each one, results are averaged over 100 runs. Each
data point of the scatter plot (see figure 4) corresponds to a
couple (inc, dec) and represents both the aggregateIndex
(y-value) and the mean tolerance (x-value) obtained when
all the agents are satisfied. We can observe that heightening
the parameter dec (while inc remains constant) pushes the
point solution to the left toward the Pareto front. Conversely,
lowering the parameter inc (while dec is constant) moves
up the point solution on one front. This analysis leads us to
choose a particular point on the Pareto-front that represents
a good compromise between both intolerance and low seg-
regation. To conduct the following simulations, we choose
the point corresponding to the parameter values inc = 0.029
and dec = 0.017 (See the arrow on figure 4).
Results
Initially, all the tolerances are set to 0.1. We can ob-
serve on figure 5 the spatial configuration at the end of
a representative run when all the agents are satisfied: af-
ter 513 steps, the mean Qi over the population is 0.306,
the mean tolerance over the population is 0.369 and
the aggregateIndex is 0.383. On 100 runs, we obtain
on average an aggregateIndex of 0.388 (0.0110) and a
mean tolerance of 0.370 (0.0048). The value for the
aggregateIndex (0.388) has to be compared with the ones
obtained with the two previous models (0.957 and 0.919)
The frontier between homogeneous patterns is constituted
by the most tolerant agents and there is no scoria inside the
patterns. One observes that homogeneous areas are infil-
trated by many secluded individuals: there are some niches
which co-exist within a cohort of unlike agents; this is pos-
sible only because loners are very tolerant. In contrast with
Figure 4: Parameter space analysis
Tolerance vs. Segregation
the previous models, vacant locations don’t play any role
in isolating individuals from each other. The most impor-
tant feature of this model is that it prevents intolerant agents
from high segregation. As the Schelling’s model provided
an example for the case [¯i → S], this model exemplify the
[i → S¯] micro-macro link.
Conclusion and future work
In this article, we have proposed to extend the Schelling’s
model considering that every individual has its own toler-
ance level. In a first step we have proposed a simple way
to locally manage the tolerance; all that gives rise to the
emergence of a new kind of border and inner scoria both
made up of the most tolerant agents. In a second stage, we
have introduced new dynamics that consists of combining
two antagonist strengths. As a result of this confrontation,
the agents are able to reach an equilibrium where they all are
satisfied, rather intolerant, but where the aggregation level
remains low. As, at our knowledge, there is no prior work
on this topic, this result is a significant challenge to the anal-
ysis conducted by Schelling: it shows that one can avoid
segregation if the tolerance level is adaptive, which is in our
opinion a better assumption.
In future work, we will revisit those results by consid-
ering situations closer to reality. Beyond a simple world of
agents embedded on an homogeneous toroidal-grid, we have
to consider different types of network as for example neigh-
bourhoods defined from a scale-free network. We have ob-
served the emergence of very different type of frontiers: no-
man’s-land, mediator-land or in some extend mixing; thus,
Figure 5: Intolerant agents avoid global segregation
View at convergence (ticks = 513): mean
tolerance = 0.369, aggregateIndex = 0.383
it might be interesting to study for a border, its composition,
its spatial distribution, its volume, porosity, permeability,...
and so to better understand its function: place of exchange
and/or medium to isolate.
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